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Abstract 
In the era of experience economy, how best to deliver memorable and exciting customer experiences 
has become a key issue for service providers, and customers can involve themselves in service 
experience delivery by actively deciding appropriate services rather than passively accepting existing 
ones. However, service providers frequently consider profit and cost first despite knowing that 
high-quality service can maximize satisfaction. A dilemma emerges particularly in the oligopoly 
market. Oligopoly service providers generally have no need to expend additional efforts and costs in 
attracting customers, and thus are considered a value-bounded context for customers in which 
providers only provide customers with existing services and restricted values. Accordingly, this study 
devises an interaction design mechanism to assist oligopoly service providers in effectively managing 
customer expectations within the dynamic interactions even in value-bounded contexts. The proposed 
mechanism models this interaction design problem as a series of Hawk-Dove games toward an 
evolutionary stable state. The simulation results suggest that oligopoly service providers should 
change their original mindset and design the interactions to manage customer expectations within the 
service experience delivery to not only achieve high satisfaction and profit but also engage customers 
to co-create the values. 






Oligopoly is a common market structure in markets characterized by imperfect competition. As a 
result of the global division of labor and economic slump, numerous industries have transformed into 
oligopolies through mergers and alliances. For example, the merger of Google and YouTube provides 
a famous case of an oligopoly involving online portal sites. An oligopoly market involves far fewer 
sellers than buyers. Oligopoly service providers frequently dominate customer interactions while 
producing and designing their services. Service providers primarily focus on competition rather than 
considering customers. Additionally, oligopoly service providers generally lack a long-term 
perspective on value co-creation with their customers, leaving customers with no choice but to accept 
existing service provider services. Accordingly, an oligopoly market can be considered a value 
bounded context in which customer value is limited in terms of the bounded number of various 
available services offered by the oligopoly service providers or the bounded resources expended on 
customer service. 
In the experience economy, service providers need to understand customer needs to create memorable 
service experiences, and customer expectations are considered critical during service experience 
delivery (Pine and Gilmore, 1999). Managing customer expectations thus is critical to successfully 
achieving customer satisfaction. Service providers can define and operate competitive services related 
to customer expectations to increase their market competency (Pitt and Barbara, 2004; Schurter and 
Towers, 2006). Service providers can attempt to provide good experiences and design appropriate 
customer interactions by managing customer expectations without significantly damaging revenue. 
This differs from the dilemma in which service providers must decide whether to attempt to increase 
service options or reduce price, and both involve complex market issues such as market share and 
existing competition. 
This study presents an interaction design mechanism for managing customer expectations by 
providing the oligopoly service providers with directions on how to fulfil customer requirements 
during service encounters. This study fulfils two objectives, as follows. First, this work proposes a 
quantitative mechanism to enable service providers to monitor and direct customer interactions during 
service encounters to manage customer expectations and ensure customer satisfaction. Second, this 
study also performs simulation experiments to demonstrate the performance and feasibility of 
applying the proposed mechanism to oligopoly service providers and clarify the extent of value 
co-creation in the value bounded context. 
2 RELATED WORKS 
2.1 Customer Expectation 
A dual-level (namely desired and adequate levels) and dynamic model of customer expectations offers 
the optimal means of characterizing those expectations (Parasuraman et al., 1991). The desired and 
adequate expectation levels refer to the service level the customer hopes to receive and that the 
customer finds acceptable, respectively. The desired level is a combination of what the customer 
believes the product “can be” and what it “should be”. On the other hand, the adequate level is 
partially based on “predicted service” level of the customer, namely, the customer appraisal of what 
service “will be”. The zone of tolerance can vary among customer, and even in the same customer 
among different situations. 
Understanding customer expectations requires service providers to successfully reach the customer 
franchise (Rust et al., 1999; Parasuraman et al., 1991). The multiple expectations conceptualization 
influences the resource allocation of service providers (Walker and Baker, 2000). This study 
implements customer expectation management to provide governance for exercising the expectation 
determinants and thus expectation levels. Service providers can meet customer expectations and 
achieve customer satisfaction provided they deliver services in a manner that considers the 




interaction design mechanism, thus affecting the service delivery process and ensuring customer 
satisfaction. 
2.2 Hawk-Dove Game 
In nature, individuals must forage and sometimes fight for food. The Hawk-Dove game is one 
application of game theory to animal behaviors (Kokko et al., 2006). The game describes the situation 
in which contestants can select either an aggressive (namely Hawk) or non-aggressive strategy (that is 
Dove) to compete for a collective resource. For example, Hawks use every opportunity to steal or 
defend the food, while Doves never steal or resist. These two birds thus comprise a polymorphic 
population. Mathematically, the Hawk-Dove game is a non-zero sum matrix game with the payoff 
matrix listed in Table 1, where V denotes the value of the contested resource, C represents the cost of 
escalated fight (Smith and Parker, 1976), and the resource value is assumed to be less than the cost of 
a fight (namely C > V > 0). 
The payoff matrix reveals four possible fight situations. In the first case, when Hawk encounters 
Hawk, the winner obtains a resource with value V while the loser bears the cost of fight C, or equally 
both participants share the cost of fight C/2. In the second case, when Hawk meets Dove, the Hawk 
monopolizes the entire resource and leaves the Dove with nothing. In the third case, when Dove meets 
Hawk, the Dove receives no resource from the Hawk. In the fourth and final case, two Doves meet 
each other and share the value of the resource with V/2. 
 Hawk Dove 
Hawk (V-C)/2, (V-C)/2 V, 0 
Dove 0, V V/2, V/2 
Table 1. The basic payoff matrix of Hawk-Dove game 
The relationship between V and C yields different results in terms of population equilibrium. 
Equilibrium denotes the optimal combination of strategies adopted by game participants. Through 
approaching equilibrium, players can achieve the optimized value. In the aforementioned classic 
Hawk-Dove game, if C > V > 0, the proportion of individuals in the population adopting the Hawk 
strategy tends to equal to V/C as the equilibrium. (If C < V, the environment is more favorable to 
Hawks but this factor is not considered in this study.). Each individual considers value and cost in 
deciding which strategy to adopt. Meanwhile, strategy selection may eventually approach a stable 
evolutionary state (so-called ESS). ESS is crucial in strategy selection owing to the evolutionary 
dynamics (namely, enabling strategy selection to occur in continuous time) within a simple 
game-theoretical framework (that is, a restricted equilibrium concept for a two-player game) 
(Berninghaus and Ehrhart, 2003). The concept of ESS involves characterizing specific Nash 
equilibriums that are immune to the invasion of mutant strategies and were developed during the 
1970s (Smith and Price, 1973). ESS equilibrium was shown to be sufficiently strong to attract players 
who could perform better in other equilibriums such as the dominated equilibrium (Berninghaus and 
Ehrhart, 2003) particularly when players who are not fully informed regarding the payoff functions 
were unaware that they were selecting an ESS.  
In this study, we apply the Hawk-Dove game to simulate cost and value among oligopoly service 
providers and customers to examine strategy selection in the game. The evolutionary dynamics 
involved between games is considered to be based on continued interactions between provider and 
customers within service delivery, and thus the ESS equilibrium is also adopted to guide strategy 
selection. 
 









3 EXPECTATION MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVE 
The purpose here is to explore a little further into the aim of the expectation management of the 
proposed control framework. According to the dual leveled expectation model (Parasuraman .etc, 
1991), customers’ service expectations have two levels: desired and adequate. For the high 
competence service providers in oligopoly market, the goal of the expectation management in the 
proposed control mechanism is to raise the adequate level expectation and stabilize the desire level 
expectation. 
Competent service providers servicing the oligopoly market can manage customer expectations by 
raising the adequate expectation (e.g., from Adequate to Adequate’) and stabilizing desired 
expectations to reduce the tolerance zone (as shown in Fig. 1) that thus increases the barriers to 
competition. For example, since Apple uses branding and promotion raise customer expectations of its 
product, customers expect the product to be superior to alternatives. Customer loyalty proves that 
Apple has successfully managed customer expectations by raising them, and occupied a special 
position in the market for computer systems. 
4 HAWK-DOVE GAME BASED INTERACTION DESIGN 
MECHANISM 
This study attempts to design an interaction design mechanism that oligopoly service providers can 
use to manage customer expectations during service encounters. The mechanism includes five 
modules, namely the context detection module, determinant decision module, Hawk-Dove game 
module, expectation measurement module, and solution selection module, of the Hawk-Dove game 
based interaction design mechanism (as depicted in Fig. 2).  
4.1 Context Detection Module 
The context detection module is designed to realize the environmental situation during service 
delivery. For instance, the service operations and resources should be carefully considered to optimize 
service delivery performance and efficacy. The proposed module must recognize customer feedback 
and behavior, which can be immediately and correctly reposed to the mechanism for further 
modifying the determinant decision module. Consequently, the learning approach offers a critical and 
important method via which the mechanism can delivery services in a dynamic context. 
4.2 Determinant Decision Module 
The determinant decision module collects useful determinants able to effectively influence customer 
expectations via inputs from the context detection module, customer preferences (such as age, brand 
interest, price etc.), and encounter database which contains past customer data, delivered service 
information, and so on. Subsequently, this module automatically analyzes and converts the encounter 
data, customer preferences and the key performance indicators of the organizer (namely KPIs owing 
to the exhibition organizer determining the objectives of the whole exhibition) into computable scores 
to obtain the weight of each determinant. The weight of each determinant indicates the degree of 
influence on customer expectation within the context. This module selects candidate expectation 
determinants that can be adopted to influence customer expectations regarding service delivery. 
4.3 Hawk-Dove Game Module 
This module determines the appropriate expectation determinants to exercise during service 
encounters. After the determinant decision module obtains the weight of each candidate expectation 
determinant, the Hawk-Dove game module adopts these determinants as inputs and calculates the 
appropriate interaction design for use in service delivery. Figure 4 details the procedure of the 
Hawk-Dove game module. Based on the input data from the determinant decision module and 




define target goals for customer expectations. The Hawk-Dove game for the determinant selection 
component thus selects determinants appropriate for exercising on customers for customer 
expectations based on the ESS goal identification component. Finally, these determinants can be 




















Figure 2. The Design logic 
4.4 Solution Selection Module 
After the Hawk-Dove game module calculates the appropriate determinants to exercise during service 
delivery, the solution selection module aims to identify the most suitable service components for 
realizing customer expectation management in the value-bounded context. This confirmation is done 
by forecasting the effects of the chosen determinants using the expectation measurement module that 
provides both the scores of the dual expectation measurements and appropriate expectation tactics. 
4.5 Expectation Measurement Module 
This module measures the likely performance of selected determinants obtained using the selection 
solution module by calculating the customer expectation scores to help the solution selection model 
choose appropriate service components. Expectation measurement module is a critical function (Hsieh 
and Yuan, 2009) for realizing customer mental status, and helps ensure the integrity and effectiveness 
of the Hawk-Dove game based interaction design mechanism. The measure used for expectations is 
based on a mathematical model based on Fechner’s Law (Thurstone, 1929) and operation risk (Basel, 
2001). The process of the expectation measurement model, which involves three separate stages, 
namely: expectation determinants, expectation measurement model and customer expectations. The 
measurement model also contains feedback which can continuously refresh a real-time database to 
measure customer expectations. 
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Experiments related to Customer Expectation Management 
The Hawk-Dove game based interaction design mechanism is designed to manage customer 
expectations regarding the objectives of oligopoly service providers. Since customer expectations 
vary within dynamic environments, customer stereotypes and their preferences should be considered. 
This experiment aims to analyze and manage customer expectations to refine the mechanism by 






















whether the Hawk-Dove game based interaction design mechanism offers a useful means of managing 
customer expectations and identifying customer stereotypes regarding which mechanism is most 
effective. Expectation management is designed to help oligopoly service providers lift expectations 
regarding what is adequate and stabilize the desired expectation. Consequently, the zone of tolerance 
derived from the desired level narrows accordingly. This experiment applies this mechanism to 
examine the effects of different customer stereotypes. 
Customers 
Stereotypes Indicators Stereotype 1 Stereotype 2 Stereotype 3 
Arrival often seldom seldom 
Capability high medium low 
Effort medium much a little 
Request growth relation existence 
Subjective preference medium, low medium, low high, medium 
Table 2. Three customer stereotypes of variability 
 
Number of experimented customer stereotypes 3 
Number of customers in each stereotype 3 
Initial adequate expectation measurement value 3.5 
Initial desired expectation measurement value 7 
Number of service encounters 10 
Number of runs 10 
Table 3. The parameter settings 
Five types of arrival, capability, effort, request, and subjective preference influence customer behavior 
(Frei, 2006). Table 2 lists different customer stereotypes, including stereotype 1 primarily for 
self-growing needs with the medium effort, stereotype 2 in which customers expend greater efforts to 
bargain with the oligopoly service provider, and stereotype 3, which is opposite to the stereotype 1, 
mainly for ad-hoc existence needs with little effort. 
This set of experiments not only employs the above three stereotypes to demonstrate how the 
Hawk-Dove game based interaction design mechanism handles the management of customer 
expectation during service encounters, but also compares the measurements of adequate and desired 
expectations for each customer stereotype. For simplicity, this study assumes that all customers have 
the same initial score of expectation states (namely 3.5 indicates adequate while 7 indicates desired). 
The Hawk-Dove game based interaction design mechanism organizes ten service encounters for every 
customer and applies the appropriate determinants at each encounter (as listed in Table 3). Each 
experiment employs three users in each stereotype to simulate and record the change in expectations 
at every encounter over ten runs. The results shown in Fig. 3-4 are then obtained by averaging the 
variation in expectations of users belonging to the same stereotype. 
 





Figure 4. Desired level of customer expectation 
Fig. 3 shows that the trend of adequate expectations regarding stereotype 1 increases with the growth 
of the encounters. For stereotypes 2 and 3, the trends indicate slight growth via the mechanism. 
Regarding the stabilization of the desired expectation, Fig. 4 also shows that the mechanism 
effectively controls customer stereotypes. Moreover, regarding the mechanism goal of lifting the 
adequate expectation level and stabilizing the desired level, the experiment results indicate that the 
mechanism has successfully achieved these goals, particularly for stereotype 1. 
Stereotype 1 is frequently considered to indicate the target customers of the oligopoly market, who 
generally have higher capabilities and the domain knowledge necessary to independently select the 
best service type (Rowley, 1996). Stereotype 1 is also willing to make more effort to become involved 
in service experience delivery (Rowley, 1996). When stereotype 1 customers lack services choices, 
this can result in medium or low expectations. These experimental results demonstrate that oligopoly 
service providers can provide stereotype 1 customers with the opportunity to reflect their needs and 
become involved in service experience delivery through meticulously designed interactions to manage 
expectations. The mechanism can adjust the determinants when customer expectations move in the 
opposite direction or exceed the range. Consequently, the Hawk-Dove game based interaction design 
mechanism not only provides customers with proper services, but also reliably services customer 
expectations. 
5.2 Experiments for High Performance of the H&D Game based Interaction Design 
Mechanism 
This set of experiments is designed to verify how changes in visitor expectations increase the benefits 
to all stakeholders (i.e., high performance). This experiment evaluates the overall performance of the 
Hawk-Dove game based interaction design mechanism from a macro perspective. A high performance 
ecosystem means all stakeholders (including oligopoly service providers and customers) should 
maximally benefit from this mechanism. This experiment applies the surplus value theory (Marx, 
1952) to examine eco-system performance by evaluating stakeholder value perceptions. The equation 
of surplus value is as follows:  
S = P – (C + V)    
where S denotes surplus value, P represents total value, C is total spending on investments and 
material, V denotes spending on labor, and (C + V) represents total cost.  
Parameter Definition 
Sp Surplus value of service providers 
Pp 
The proportion of variation of the zone of tolerance managed after Hawk-Dove 
game based interaction design mechanism to the original zone of tolerance (z-z’)/z 
(C + V) p Providers’ participation 
Sc Surplus value of customers 
Pc Real customers’ responses 
(C + V) c Customers’ participation  
Table 4. The definitions of parameters in surplus value 
This set of experiments uses pareto optimal to evaluate the performance of the Hawk-Dove game 




improvement in one objective does not lead to a simultaneous degradation in one or more of the 
remaining objectives. A pareto optimal outcome is one such that no-one is made better off without 
making someone else worse off. Customer services are supposed to be the pareto optimal solution 
obtained via the Hawk-Dove game based interaction design mechanism based on consideration of 
various interaction design factors, including profit and cost. The measurement model thus examines 
the maximum surplus value performance of all stakeholders of the Hawk-Dove game based 
interaction design mechanism with the following objective function: 
Maximum:  Sp = Pp – (C + V) p     
Maximum:  Sc = Pc – (C + V) c          
Table 4 lists the definitions of experiment parameters. The Hawk-Dove interaction design mechanism 
uses the proportion of zone variation to the original zone to represent Pp, and uses the total cost of 
implementing the service components during the journey to represent (C + V) p. The mechanism 
employs the customer satisfaction score for all the service components experienced in the service 
delivery to represent the Pc. Finally, the mechanism takes the entire time spent in interacting with 
every service component in service encounters to represent (C + V) c. The experiment uses the 
Hawk-Dove game based interaction design mechanism to arrange 25 customers. The customer 
satisfaction score for each encounter minus the customer effort of interacting with the service 
component can be represented Sc. The proportion of zone variation to the original zone minus the cost 
of implementing all service components is represented as Sp. The experiments also randomly generate 
25 customers that are assigned the values of Sc and Sp. The random scopes and roles are primarily 
referenced from the domain experts and practical reports. Comparing these two groups of customers 
with the overall surplus value is to clarify the effect of Hawk-Dove game interaction design 
mechanism in building a high performance eco-system. 
 
Figure 5. Performances of the proposed mechanism in surplus value 
Based on the results of the ecosystem evaluation experiment (as shown in Fig. 5), each point 
represents a visitor (i.e., the red square represents that the customer is served by the proposed 
mechanism and the blue rhombus indicates that the customer is randomly assigned the values of Sc 
and Sp). Except for a single square point, Sc contains no outperforming rhombus point. Moreover, for 
any pot belonging to the square group, if any pots in the rhombus group have the better performance 
in Sp, those same pots must have worse-off performance in Sc. To conclude, the simulation results 
clearly demonstrate that the Hawk-Dove game interaction design mechanism can not only build a 
good performance ecosystem but can also benefit customers and providers by providing pareto 
optimality. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In the experience economy, service providers must design and deliver good customer service based on 
understanding of customer needs. Service providers can increase customer loyalty to achieve high 
profits by developing their abilities in experience design (Pullman and Gross, 2004). Interaction 
design in service experience delivery aims to create functional, purposeful, engaging, compelling, and 
memorable customer experiences (McLellan, 2000). Moreover, customer involvement can be 




market, although service providers play a dominant role, they still need to consider customer 
satisfaction and develop new services. However, the dilemma that businesses face relates to providing 
additional services to satisfy customers versus maintaining high profits but risking customer 
discontent. This predicament becomes serious particularly in oligopoly markets, namely a value 
bounded context for customers. For resolving the dilemma issue in the oligopoly market, this study 
presents the Hawk-Dove game interaction design mechanism to increase values between service 
providers and customers in the value bounded context via customer expectation management and 
service interaction design. This work not only examines the factors of customer satisfaction and 
service experience but also establishes a mechanism based on expectation theory and the Hawk-Dove 
game to deliver a high quality customer experience. 
The experimental results generated via the mechanism can also help oligopoly service providers 
ascertain that good customer expectation management enhances customer satisfaction and profits. 
Oligopoly service providers can employ only limited resources and consider the context situation to 
deliver appropriate services and ensure customer satisfaction particularly for stereotype 1 customers 
using the interface artifact empowered by a measurable and computable modeling of customer 
psychological expectations. Oligopoly service providers have increased opportunities for customer 
involvement, enabling customers to contribute to achieve goal value co-creation. Although oligopoly 
service providers do not need to change their ways and present situations, they can still earn 
considerable money without the consideration of customer needs and perceptions. Once oligopoly 
service providers follow the proposed mechanism to achieve an effective and interactive form of 
service design, they can attract more customers to experience the services and increase their market 
share, thus boosting profits and eco-system performance. 
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